By Rayford H. Taylor

L&S CONSTRUCTION et. al. v. LOPEZ, S.E.2d, 2007 WL 410995 (Ga. App. Nov.26,2007)

L&S Construction (“L&S”) was hired by Bob St. John Construction (“St. John”) to frame a house. Mr. Lopez was injured while working on that construction and was awarded workers compensation benefits. L&S defended the claim on the basis that Mr. Lopez was actually an employee of an entity that had no workers compensation coverage. L&S argued that St. John, as the general contractor, was liable for providing benefits. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) concluded Mr. Lopez was employed by L&S.

L&S appealed the ALJ’s order to the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers Compensation. The Appellate Division affirmed the ALJ’s order and award of benefits from L&S to the Claimant. However, the award of attorney’s fee to the Claimant was reversed because there was a ”reasonable dispute” about which entity was the Claimant’s employer at the time of the accident.

Both Mr. Lopez and St. John appealed the Appellate Division’s ruling to the Superior Court in Jones County, arguing there was no reasonable dispute concerning the Claimant’s employer. The Superior Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision regarding the award of attorney’s fees to Mr. Lopez’s attorney from L&S.

The Court of Appeals accepted L&S’s petition for discretionary review and reversed the Superior Court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals applied the “any evidence” rule and stated that the Appellate Division’s finding of “reasonable dispute” was supported by some facts in the record and therefore the Superior Court should have upheld the ruling below. The fact the position taken by L&S at trial did not prevail was not the determining factor as to whether the position it adopted was reasonable. Since there was some evidence in the record to support the Appellate Division’s conclusions and factual findings, it had to be affirmed on appeal.

DEES v. LOGAN, 653 S.E.2d 735 (Ga. Nov.21, 2007)

Dees and his wife filed suit against Logan seeking damages arising out of an automobile accident. The jury awarded Dees damages. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) was the uninsured motorist carrier (“UM”) for Dees. State Farm argued it could offset the jury’s award by the amounts received by Dees for workers compensation and social security benefits, which resulted in it not having to pay Dees the amounts awarded by the jury.

The Court of Appeals affirmed State Farm’s right of setoff in part because UM contracts contained clauses which prohibited duplication of benefits and were enforceable. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Appellate court’s ruling, and held that such provisions were void and unenforceable in Georgia. The Supreme Court found that Section 33-7-11(i) O.C.G.A. prohibited double recovery for property damage, but did not expressly prohibit duplication of benefits for personal injury.

Under the Supreme Court’s ruling, Dees was entitled to a full recovery from State Farm for amounts awarded to them. Because this case only involved State Farm’s asserted rights, the opinion did not address the worker’s compensation carrier’s subrogation rights for benefits paid as a result of the accident.